Does the price of strategic commodities respond to U.S. Partisan
  Conflict? by Jiang, Yong et al.
1 
 
Does strategic commodities price respond to U.S. Partisan Conflict? 
Evidence from a parametric test of Granger causality in quantiles1 
 
Yong Jiang 
Business School, Hunan University, Changsha 410082, China 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Currently, U.S. politics have been characterized by a high degree of partisan conflict, 
which has led to increasing polarization and high policy uncertainty. Given the 
importance of U.S. in the global commodity market, we investigate whether U.S. 
partisan conflict affects the price performance (returns and volatility) of two strategic 
commodities (oil and gold). To this end, we employ a parametric test of Granger 
causality in quantiles proposed by Troster (2016), which can discriminate between 
causality affecting the median and the tails of the conditional distribution. Meanwhile, 
this approach allows us to investigate whether there exist different effects of U.S. 
partisan conflict index on the oil market and gold market under different market 
conditions. The empirical results suggest that U.S. partisan conflict can affect the 
returns of oil and gold, with the effects cluster around the tail of the conditional 
distribution of returns. More specifically, the partisan conflict mainly affects the oil 
returns when the crude oil market is in a bearish state (lower quantiles). By contrast, 
partisan conflict matters for gold returns only when the gold market is in a bullish 
scenario (higher quantiles). In addition, for the volatility of oil and gold, the 
predictability of partisan conflict index virtually covers the entire distribution of 
volatility. This study provides valuable implications for academics, policymakers, and 
investors. 
Keywords: Strategic commodities; Oil and gold prices; Partisan Conflict; Granger 
causality in quantiles 
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1. Introduction  
Oil and gold are the two most important commodities in the world, and 
improving the understanding of drivers of their prices is a longstanding research 
objective. To date, a large number of studies have investigated the impact factors of 
commodity prices. In general, as an internationally traded commodity, oil and gold be 
deemed to have the similar properties to ordinary commodities whose prices are 
mainly influenced by the supply-side factors and demand-side factors (Cai et al., 2001; 
Tully and Lucey, 2007; Kilian, 2009; Gallo et al., 2010; Coleman, 2012; Kim and 
Vera, 2018). In recent years, with the turbulence in the international situation and the 
slowdown in the global economic recovery process, strategic commodities especially 
for oil, whose economic importance and the geographical imbalance between 
availability and consumption make it become a politically sensitive commodity. 
Likewise, in regard to gold, it always is used by investors as a hedge in portfolio 
diversification and a safe haven in times of extreme economic, inflation and political 
turbulence and severe market turmoil (Baur and McDermott, 2010; Lau et al., 2017; 
O‟Connor et al., 2015; Aye et al., 2016). Up to now, a vast body of literature provides 
evidence that the crude oil and gold price may tend to be sharply influenced by the 
non-fundamentals such as the economic policy uncertainty (EPU), investor attention 
and political risk (Coleman, 2012; Chen et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2017; Yao et al., 
2017; Uddin et al., 2018). For example, evidence in Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) 
suggests that investors' risk perceptions and speculative behaviors have a strong 
influence over the movements of oil prices. Jones and Sackley (2016) incorporate the 
U.S. economic policy uncertainty index into a gold-pricing model and find that gold 
prices are positively related to EPU.  
The U.S. is the largest consumer of crude oil and the second largest net importer 
of crude oil in the world (British Petroleum (BP), 2017). BP statistics show that the 
U.S. consumed 19631 thousand barrels per day in 2016, accounting for 20.3% of the 
world's consumption of crude oil. Since 2009, with the progress of shale oil recovery 
techniques, crude oil production in the US has gradually intensified, the U.S. has 
become the world‟s second-largest oil producer, just after Saudi Arabia. In 2016, it 
produced 12.354 million barrels, accounting for a global share of 13.4%. It can be 
seen that the United States has an important position in the crude oil market, both in 
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supply and in demand aspects. Meanwhile, the US has the largest gold reserve in the 
world, reaching 8133.5 tons in 2017, accounting for 72.65% of its foreign exchange 
reserves. To sum up, given the importance of US in the global commodity market, it 
cannot ignore the role that the US has played in the price mechanism of international 
strategic commodities. Some evidence of U.S. factors such as U.S. EPU affecting oil 
price from structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models applied to monthly data 
has been found in Kang and Ratti (2013a, 2013b) and Antonakakis et al. (2014). For 
gold market, Balcilar et al. (2017) find that there exists a causality running from U.S. 
EPU to gold returns.  
Recent years, U.S. politics have been characterized by a high degree of partisan 
conflict. The combination of increasing polarization and the divided government may 
lead to the deepening panic for investors in the financial market. For example, 
Azzimonti (2018) has proven that U.S. partisan conflict affects the private investment. 
Gupta et al. (2017, 2018) provide evidence that the U.S. partisan conflict has a critical 
impact on the U.S. stock market. Fig.1 displays the dynamics of oil prices, gold prices 
and U.S. partisan conflict index. We use US refiner‟s acquisition cost of crude oil as 
the measure of the global crude oil prices and gold price is obtained from London 
Bullion Market. As can be seen that, the partisan conflict index tends to increase near 
elections and during debates over such contentious policies as the debt ceiling and 
health-care reform (Azzimonti, 2018). For instance, the rise in partisan conflict 
accelerated during the Great Recession, peaking with the 2013 government shutdown. 
During the Trump-Clinton election in 2016, the index up to a peak again. What is 
more, it notes that after the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the US partisan conflict 
index has a significant upward trend. At the same time, it shows that the prices of 
crude oil and gold also have a corresponding upward trend, respectively. Through 
simple statistics based on Spearman's rank correlation coefficient approach, using the 
entire sample data we preliminarily estimate the correlation coefficient of the partisan 
conflict index and the crude oil price is 0.3, with the price of gold is 0.68. It indicates 
that there exists a link between the partisan conflict index and the price of crude oil 
and gold. However, how does the U.S. partisan conflict index affect the price 
movements of gold and oil, linear or nonlinear? Does the effect of the partisan 
conflict index on the returns and volatility of the two strategic commodities be 
homogeneous in different market conditions? It is of significance to answer these 
questions for managing risk, hedging and making investment decisions.  
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Fig. 1 Oil and gold prices and U.S. partisan conflict index from January 1981 to October 2017.  
Notes: Right axis is U.S. partisan conflict index. The shaded regions represent NBER recessions. 
 
To address these issues, this paper obtains an index of U.S. partisan conflict (PCI) 
recently developed by Azzimonti (2018) as the proxy of U.S. partisan conflict 
condition, using a parametric test of Granger causality in quantiles recently proposed 
by Troster (2016) to study whether the U.S. partisan conflict can predict the returns 
and volatility of strategic commodities price. Our empirical analysis uses monthly 
data of oil and gold prices and of the U.S. partisan conflict indices spanning the 
January 1981 to October 2017. This paper makes several important contributions to 
5 
 
the literature as follows.  
First, this paper contributes to the literature that examining the predictive effect 
of U.S. partisan conflict on the returns and volatility for oil and gold. Though some 
studies have considered the effect of non-fundamentals such as the EPU and investor 
sentiment, to date, there is little research has examined whether the U.S. partisan 
conflicts have an impact on the returns and volatility for oil and gold. By doing this, 
we provide a new indicator that can easily be observed for investors to track the 
dynamic characteristics such as returns and volatility on the price of crude oil and 
gold. To our knowledge, this is the first study to test this empirically and thus presents 
a contribution to the literature to date. 
Second, concerning the volatility estimation of oil and gold, contrary to previous 
papers characterize the volatility of oil and gold prices by using some time-varying 
volatility models such as GARCH and SV models (Hammoudeh and Yuan, 2008; 
Ewing and Malik, 2016) but cannot identify which one is better among so many 
GARCH and SV models. By means of efficient approach, we compare a number of 
GARCH and SV models in a formal Bayesian model comparison exercise. The 
competing models include the standard models of GARCH (1,1) and SV with an 
AR(1) log-volatility process, as well as flexible models with jumps, volatility in mean, 
leverage effects, t distributed and moving average innovations (see Chan and Grant, 
2016). To our knowledge, to date, only Chan and Grant (2016) have investigated and 
selected the best volatility model for oil price in their article. However, no study has 
explored which model can better describe the price volatility of gold.  
Third, rather than focusing on specific episodes of market periods, this paper 
employs a parametric quantile causality testing approach which is powerful enough to 
consider all market conditions jointly (e.g., bearish, bullish, low volatility and high 
volatility). Therefore, we can examine the predictive ability of U.S. partisan conflict 
index for the oil market and gold market under different market conditions. This will 
allow us to see under what conditions the U.S. partisan conflict index could predict 
the oil and gold or does not.  
Four and last, we are the first to use the parametric test of Granger causality in 
quantiles recently proposed by Troster (2016) to study whether U.S. partisan conflicts 
can cause the returns and volatility of oil and gold. The causality in quantile test 
approach has two novel aspects: first, the approach takes different locations and scales 
of the conditional distribution into account, which can provide more rich information 
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on causality between U.S. partisan conflicts and commodities prices than the 
traditional mean causality. Next, the approach can address the problem of structural 
break and sample segmentation. Existing studies have proved that oil and gold prices 
have nonlinear and structural mutation characteristics (Chen et al., 2014; Uludag and 
Lkhamazhapov, 2014; Gil-Alana et al., 2015) and which may have an adverse impact 
on linear model estimation (Troster, 2016). Traditionally, most literature such as Fan 
and Xu (2011), Pershin et al. (2016), chooses to segment the sample, but the sample 
segmentation will lose the sample information. The approach allows us to examine 
causal relationships at any chosen conditional quantiles without pre-selecting some 
arbitrary sub-samples (Jeong et al., 2012).  
We provide evidence that there is no significant evidence supporting a causal link 
between the U.S. partisan conflict index and the oil and gold returns at the median of 
the conditional distribution. The explanatory power of U.S. partisan conflict index on 
the oil and gold returns tends to cluster around at the tails of the conditional 
distribution. More specifically, the partisan conflict has a strong predictive power on 
the oil returns when the crude oil market is in a bearish state, however, under a bullish 
state, the impact of the partisan conflict on oil returns is not significant. By contrast, 
partisan conflict matters for gold returns only when the gold market is in a bullish 
market. It is found that for gold returns at lower quantiles, the partisan conflict index 
has limited predictive power on the gold returns, with the 0.2 quantiles being an 
exception. In addition, it is proven that the U.S. partisan conflict index significantly 
affects the volatility of oil and gold prices over the entire conditional distribution, i.e., 
at various phases of the oil and gold market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as the following: Section 2 provides a 
brief relevant literature review. Section 3 presents the data and preliminary analysis. 
Section 4 introduces the empirical methodologies and research framework. Section 5 
discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the major conclusions of this 
study and some policy implications. 
2. Literature 
The continued financialization in commodities markets over the last decade 
together with their use as a diversifier, hedge and safe haven for different traditional 
investments have generated a great deal of interest in the predictability of 
commodities returns and volatilities. Especially oil and gold are the world's most 
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important two commodities, and improving the understanding of drivers of their 
prices is a longstanding research objective. Recent years, with the deeper of 
financialization of the crude oil and gold market, a larger body of literature focuses on 
the non-fundamental factors such as EPU, investor attention, and political risk, and so 
on. In this section, we collate the recent studies on the impact of non-fundamental 
factors on the price of crude oil and gold.  
For oil market, Hamilton (2009) analyzes the cause and influence of oil price 
shocks between 2007 and 2008 and concludes that most of the shocks are triggered by 
the politics-induced oil production halts. Aloui et al. (2016) use a copula approach 
have investigated the effect of equity and EPU on crude-oil returns, find that higher 
uncertainty, as measured by equity and EPU indices, significantly increase crude-oil 
returns only during certain periods of time. Balcilar et al. (2017) use a nonparametric 
quantile causality test and argue that U.S. EPU and equity market uncertainty have 
strong predictive power for oil returns over the entire distribution barring regions 
around the median, for oil volatility the predictability virtually covers the entire 
distribution. Chen et al. (2016) use the SVAR model and investigate the impacts of 
OPEC's political risk on the Brent crude oil prices, and find that the political risk of 
OPEC countries does have a significant and positive influence on Brent crude. Uddin 
et al. (2018) select the EPU index of US and Europe, implied US bond volatility index, 
the US VIX index, market sentiment and speculation index of US as the geopolitical 
risks, using an entropy-based wavelet method study the impact of geopolitical risks on 
the oil price changes. Yao et al. (2017), Han et al. (2017) and Afkhami et al. (2017) 
provide evidence that investor attention for the oil market has strong predictive power 
on oil prices. Qadan and Nama (2018) show that investor sentiment, captured by nine 
different proxies such as U.S. EPU and consumer confidence index has a significant 
effect on the returns and volatility of oil prices.  
With regard to gold market, Jones and Sackley (2016) incorporate an index of 
the U.S. and European EPU into a gold-pricing model and find that gold prices are 
positively related to EPU. The results suggest that the safe haven status of gold 
induces an increase of its price in times of high uncertainty. Using a nonparametric 
causality-in-quantiles test, Balcilar et al. (2016) have confirmed that the policy and 
equity-market uncertainty can affect gold-price returns and volatility. Baur and 
Dimpfl, (2016) choose the internet search queries for gold as the investor's attention 
to gold price movements and find a positive relationship between the gold price 
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volatility and search queries. Li and Lucey (2017) find that EPU is a positive 
determinant of gold being an investment safe haven. Balcilar et al. (2017) find that the 
effect of investor sentiment is more prevalent on intraday volatility in the gold market, 
rather than daily returns. Bilgin et al. (2018) use U.S. partisan conflict index as the 
proxy of policy uncertainty and find that worsening EPU contributes to increases in 
the price of gold. Raza et al. (2018) find that EPU causes gold prices in all the 
examined countries (G7 and China)  
To sum up, while a substantial number of studies examine the determinants of oil 
and gold prices from the non-fundamental factors such as geopolitical risk, investor 
sentiment or attention and EPU, little research has considered the effect of U.S. 
partisan conflict on the gold price. In this paper, we try to fill this gap. 
3. Methodology 
This section presents our empirical framework that is twofold. First, we 
introduce two classes of time-varying volatility models: the generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) models and the stochastic 
volatility (SV) models to estimate the conditional volatility of oil and gold. 
Meanwhile, we examine which one model is the best to model the price volatility of 
oil and gold by comparing the Bayes factor. Then, we employ a novel parametric test 
of Granger causality in quantiles proposed by Troster (2016) to investigate the ability 
of U.S. partisan conflict index in predicting the returns and volatility of oil and gold 
prices, respectively. 
3.1. Time-varying volatility models: GARCH and SV models 
In this section, we discuss the two classes of time-varying volatility models used 
in the model comparison exercise. The competing models include the standard models 
of GARCH (1,1) and SV with an AR (1) log-volatility process, as well as flexible 
models with jumps, volatility in mean, leverage effects, and t distributed and moving 
average innovations (for detailed model descriptions see Chan and Grant, 2016). 
Both the GARCH and SV models are estimated using Bayesian techniques. One 
key step in estimating the SV models is the joint sampling of the log volatilities. That 
step is done by using the acceptance-rejection Metropolis-Hastings algorithm 
described in Chan (2017), which is based on the precision sampler of Chan and 
Jeliazkov (2009). A novel feature of this algorithm is its use of fast band matrix 
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routines rather than using the conventional Kalman filter. In general, the former 
approach is more efficient than the latter. 
We follow Chan and Grant (2016) and introduce an overview of Bayesian model 
comparison via the Bayes factor and outline an efficient approach to compute the 
Bayes factor using importance sampling. Since the Bayes factor is simply a ratio of 
two marginal likelihoods, researchers often only report the marginal likelihoods of the 
set of competing models (Chan and Grant, 2016). In this paper, we also list the 
marginal likelihoods of different volatility models. Hence, if the observed data are 
likely under the model 1M , the associated marginal likelihood would be “largest” 
among these competing models. 
Table 1 GARCH models and SV models 
Pane 1 :GARCH models  
GARCH 
GARCH(1,1) model where 
t
2  follows a stationary AR(1) 
GARCH-2 
Same as GARCH but follows 
t
2  a stationary AR(2) 
GARCH-J Same as GARCH but the price equation has a "jump" component 
GARCH-M 
Same as GARCH but 
t
2  enters the prices equation as a covariate 
GARCH-MA Same as GARCH but the observation error follows an MA(1) 
GARCH-t Same as GARCH but the observation error follows a t distribution 
GARCH-GJR GARCH with a leverage effect 
Panel 2: SV models  
SV SV model where th  follows a stationary AR(1) 
SV-2 Same as SV but th  follows a stationary AR(2) 
SV-J Same as SV but the price equation has a "jump" component 
SV-M Same as SV but th  enters the prices equation as a covariate 
SV-MA Same as SV but the observation error follows an MA(1) 
SV-t Same as SV but the observation error follows a t distribution 
SV-L SV with a leverage effect 
Notes: 
t
2  and th  denote the conditional variance. For detailed model descriptions, see Chan 
and Grant (2016). 
3.2. Granger causality in quantiles 
A novel methodology is presented here, as proposed by Troster (2016), which 
can be employed to examine the ability of U.S. partisan conflict index in predicting 
the returns and volatility of oil and gold prices across different conditional quantiles. 
In this paper, we denote U.S. partisan Conflict index as tZ  and the returns and 
volatility of the oil and gold price as tY , respectively. 
According to Granger (1969), a series 
tZ  does not Granger-cause another 
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series tY  if past tZ  does not help to predict future tY  given past tY . Suppose 
explanatory vector   dZtYtt RIII 
'''
, , qsd  , where   sstt
Y
t RYYI  
'
1,...:  and 
  q
qtt
Z
t RZZI  
'
1,...: . We characterize the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality 
from tZ  to tY  as follows: 
   0 : ,Z Y Y Z YY t t Y tH F y I I F y I ,     for all RY  .            (1) 
Where  ZtYtY IIyF ,  and  YtY IyF  be the conditional distribution functions of 
tY  given  ZtYt II ,  and YtI , respectively. We denote the null hypothesis of (1) as 
Granger non-causality in distribution. Since the estimation of the conditional 
distribution may be complicated in practice, many articles have tested Granger 
non-causality in mean, which is only a necessary condition for (1). In this case, 
tZ  
does not Granger cause 
tY  in mean if  
   YttZtYtt IYEIIYE ,    a. s.,                              (2) 
where  ZtYtt IIYE ,  and  Ytt IYE  are the mean of  ,Y ZY t tF I I  and  YY tF I , 
respectively. Granger non-causality in mean of (2) can be easily extended to higher 
order moments. However, causality in mean overlooks the dependence that may 
appear in conditional tails of the distribution. Besides, the Granger non-causality 
distribution of (1) does not inform us about the level where the causality exists, if (1) 
is rejected. Thus, we propose to test Granger non-causality in conditional quantiles, 
since it allows us to determine the pattern of causality and it provides a sufficient 
condition for testing Granger non-causality in the distribution of (1), as the quantiles 
completely characterize a distribution. Let  , ,Y Z Y Zt tQ I I   be the τ-quantiles of 
 ,Y ZY t tF I I , we can rewrite Eq. (1) as follows: 
   :Z ,0 : ,QC Y Y Z Y Z Y Yt t t t tH Q Y I I Q Y I  , a. s. for all   ,           (3) 
where   is a compact set such that  0,1   and the conditional  -quantiles of 
tY  satisfy the following restrictions: 
     :Pr YtYttYt IIYQY , a. s. for all   , 
     :,,Pr , ZtYtZtYttZYt IIIIYQY , a. s. for all            (4) 
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Given an explanatory vector tI , we have 
     tPr t t t t t t tY Q Y I I E Y Q Y I I       , where  tI Y y  is an indicator 
function of the event that a is less or equal than y . Thus (3) is equivalent to 
     ,1 , , ,Y Z Y Z Y Z Y Y Y Zt t t t t t t t t t tY Q Y I I I I E Y Q Y I I I       , 
a. s. for all   ,                     (5) 
where the left-hand side of (5) is equal to the  -quantile of  ,Y ZY t tF I I  by 
definition. Following Troster (2016), we postulate a parametric model to estimate the 
th  quantile of  YY tF I , where we assume that  tQ I   is correctly specified by 
a parametric model   ,m    belonging to a family of 
functions      , Pm R        , for  1,0 . Let   be a 
family of uniformly bounded functions     such that   PR . Then, 
under the null hypothesis in (3), the τ-conditional quantile  Y YtQ I   is correctly 
specified by a parametric model   0,YtIm , for some 0 , using only the 
restricted information set YtI , and we redefine our testing problem in (3) as 
   0 0, ,Z Y Y Y Zt t t tH E m I I I       ： , a. s. for all   ,           (6) 
versus:  
   0, ,Z Y Y Y ZA t t t tH E m I I I       ： , for some   ,              (7) 
where   0,YtIm  correctly specifies the true conditional quantile  Y YtQ I  , for all 
  . We rewrite (6) as     0 0: , 0 , 0Z Y Y Y Zt t t tH E m I I I           almost 
surely, for all   . Then we can characterize the null hypothesis (6) by a sequence 
of unconditional moment restrictions: 
    '0 0: , 0 exp( I ) 0Z Y Yt t tH E m I i                       (8) 
Where      1 1 1 ,exp exp , ...t t t r t r t ri I i Y Z Y Z     
       
  
 is a weighting 
function, for all dR   with dr  , and 1i  is the imaginary root. The rest 
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statistic is a sample analog of     '0, 0 exp( I )Yt t tE m I i          : 
       '0
1
1
, : , 0 exp
T
Y
T t t t
t
v m I i I
T
     

      
             (9) 
where T  is a T -consistent estimator of  0 , for all   .Then, we apply the 
test statistic proposed by Troster (2016):  
       dFvS
T W
TT dF,:
2
                              (10) 
where  F   is the conditional distribution function of the ad-variate standard 
normal random vector,  F  as a uniform discrete distribution over a grid of   in 
n  equi-distributed points,  n
jjn 1
  . And the vector of weights dR  is drawn 
from a standard normal distribution. The test statistic in (10) can be estimated using 
its sample counterpart. Let   be the nT  matrix   with 
elements    jTYiiji ImYj   ,,  . Then, the test statistic TS  has the form 
1
1
'. .
n
T j j
j
S
Tn
 

  W                                   (11) 
where W  is the TT  matrix with elements  
2
, exp 0.5t s t SI I    
w , and 
j. denotes the jth  column of  . It rejects the null hypothesis whenever it 
observes “large” values of TS . 
We use the subsampling procedure of Troster (2016) to calculate critical values 
for ST in Eq. (14). Given our series { ( , )}t t tX Y Z  of sample size T, we generate 
1B T b    subsamples of size b (taken without replacement from the original data) 
of the form 1{ , , }i i bX X   . Then, the test statistic TS  in Eq. (11) is calculated for 
each subsample; we obtain p-values by averaging the subsample test statistics over the 
B subsamples. Following Troster (2016), we choose a subsample of size 2/5[ ]b kT , 
where [·] is the integer part of a number, and k is a constant parameter. To apply the 
ST test in Eq. (14), we specify three different QAR models ( )m  , for all 
[0,1]  , under the null hypothesis of non-Granger-causality in Eq. (9) as 
follows: 
1 1
1 2 1(1) : ( , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
Y
t t t uQAR m I Y       

     
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2 1
1 2 1 3 2(2) : ( , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Y
t t t t uQAR m I Y Y         

       
3 1
1 2 1 3 2 4 3(3) : ( , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Y
t t t t t uQAR m I Y Y Y           

          (12) 
Where the parameters 
1 2 3 4( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), )t             are estimated by 
maximum likelihood in an equally spaced grid of quantiles, and 1( )u
   is the inverse 
of a standard normal distribution function. To verify the signature of the causal 
relationship between the variables, we estimate the quantile autoregressive models in 
Eq. (12) including lagged variables of another variable. For simplicity, we present the 
results using only a QAR (3) model with the lagged values of the other variable as 
follows: 
 , 11 2 1 3 2 4 3 1, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y Z Y Zt t t t t t t t uQ Y I I Y Y Y Z                        (13) 
4. Data  
This paper empirically investigates the ability of U.S. partisan conflict index in 
predicting the returns and volatility of oil and gold prices, using monthly data 
covering the time period from January 1981 to October 2017, with the start and end 
dates being purely driven by data availability. We use the U.S. partisan conflict index, 
developed by Azzimonti (2018), which is obtained from the website of Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
2
. This index tracks the degree of political disagreement 
among U.S. politicians at the federal level by measuring the frequency of newspaper 
articles reporting disagreement in a given month. Higher index values indicate greater 
conflict among political parties, Congress, and the President.  
We use the US refiner‟s acquisition cost of crude oil as the measure of the global 
crude oil prices which can be obtained from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) in the United States Department of Energy
3
. While the gold 
price used in this paper is the Gold Fixing Price at 3:00 P.M. (London time) in the 
London Bullion Market, based in U.S. Dollars, which is obtained from the FRED 
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
4
. The oil and gold prices are 
divided by the US consumer price index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
obtain the real price. The returns are measured in terms of the first-differenced natural 
logarithm of the real oil and gold prices. 
                                                        
2 https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/partisan-conflict-index 
3 www.eia.gov/. 
4 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
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The summary statistics of the variables have been reported in Table 1. As can be 
seen, oil returns have higher volatility than gold returns. Oil returns are skewed to the 
left, and gold returns and U.S. partisan conflict index skewed to the right, with all the 
variables having excess kurtosis. The Jarque–Bera test overwhelmingly rejects the 
null of normality, and this evidence of fat tails in the variables provides us the 
preliminary motivation to use causality-in-quantile test rather than standard linear 
Granger causality test based on the conditional mean.  
Table 1 summary statistics 
 Gold returns Oil returns Log Partisan conflict index 
Mean -0.064 -0.119 4.627 
Median -0.322 0.196 4.572 
Maximum 17.587 36.641 5.603 
Minimum -15.194 -33.942 4.081 
Std. Dev. 3.895 7.437 0.266 
Skewness 0.162 -0.552 0.811 
Kurtosis 5.180 6.743 3.580 
Jarque-Bera 89.468*** 280.452*** 54.598*** 
Observations 442 442 442 
Notes: Std.Dev denotes standard deviation; *** denotes the rejection of the null of normality of the Jarque-Bera 
test at 1% level of significance. 
With regard to the evaluation of price volatility for oil and gold, all the 
time-varying volatility models used in this paper are estimated by Bayesian 
techniques (see Chan and Grant, 2016) in this paper. The marginal likelihoods are 
computed using the improved cross-entropy method of Chan and Eisenstat (2015). 
The model comparison results are reported in Table 3. Overall, it suggests that the 
best model for modeling the price volatility of oil and gold is the SV-MA model. The 
marginal likelihood of the SV-MA model for estimating the volatility of crude oil and 
gold prices is the largest, -1393.9 and -1196.2, respectively. Therefore, in this paper, 
we employ the SV-MA model to measure the price volatility of the crude oil and gold. 
This finding of oil volatility estimation is in line with Chan and Grant（2016）who 
have proved that the SV-MA model is the best one for estimating oil price volatility. 
Furthermore, we also investigate which features are important in modeling the 
dynamic volatility of oil and gold prices by comparing the different GARCH and SV 
models. By comparing the GARCH with the GARCH-2 and the SV with the SV-2, we 
conclude that the richer AR (2) volatility process provides a higher marginal 
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likelihood of a model. Thus, for modeling volatility of oil and gold prices, the 
volatility models with the AR (2) volatility process are better than the models with AR 
(1) volatility process. 
Next, we examine the importance of volatility feedback for modeling price 
volatility of oil and gold. We find that adding the volatility feedback component 
markedly increases the marginal likelihood of SV model for oil and gold. By 
comparison, the model-fit cannot be improved by adding the volatility feedback 
component in the GARCH for the gold prices. 
To investigate the relevance of the moving average component, we compare the 
GARCH with the GARCH-MA and the SV with the SV-MA. For SV models, adding 
the MA component improves the model-fit for the crude oil and gold prices. However, 
for GARCH models, the marginal likelihood cannot be improved by adding the MA 
component for the crude oil and gold. 
We also examine whether the GARCH model and SV model with the “jump” can 
better shape the price volatility of crude oil and gold than the conventional GARCH 
and SV model. It shows that the marginal likelihood has improved when adding the 
jump component into GARCH and SV models. Therefore, it is essential to consider 
the jump component in the GARCH model and SV model when modeling the price 
volatility of crude oil and gold. 
Finally, by comparing the GARCH with the GARCH-GJR and the SV with the 
SV-L, we conclude that the leverage effect is important for modeling price volatility 
of the crude oil and gold compared to the conventional GARCH and SV model 
without the specification of leverage. As we know, the leverage effects are important 
for stock returns and crude oil price (Chan and Grant, 2016). These results support the 
fashionable argument of „financialization‟ of the crude oil and gold market. 
Table 2 Log marginal likelihoods of GARCH and SV models for the crude oil and gold price. The 
numerical standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Crude oil Gold 
GARCH -1460.3 -1213.3 
 (0.02) （0.02） 
SV -1433.6 -1200.2 
  (0.03) （0.02） 
GARCH-2  -1458.7 -1213.6 
  (0.04) -0.06 
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SV-2 -1431.2  -1201.3 
 (0.08) (0.03) 
GARCH-J -1434.9  -1205.7  
 (0.20) (0.08) 
SV-J  -1434.5  -1200.1  
 (0.05) (0.09) 
GARCH-M -1446.8 -1220.0 
  (0.04)  (0.03) 
SV-M -1440.6  -1205.4 
 (0.03)  (0.02) 
GARCH-MA -1427.1 -1204.5  
  (0.04) (0.03) 
SV-MA -1393.9 -1196.2  
  (0.03) (0.01) 
GARCH-t -1434.1 -1197.3 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
SV-t -1434.0  -1195.7  
 (0.02) (0.02) 
GARCH-GJR -1457.4 -1215.7  
  (0.02) (0.03) 
SV-L -1455.9 -1201.6  
 (0.02) (0.02) 
 
 
We perform standard unit root tests to determine whether the returns and 
volatility of oil and gold and U.S. partisan conflict index series are stationary and 
results are reported in Table 2. According to results in Table 2, the Augmented Dickey 
and Fuller (ADF, 1981) Phillips and Perron (PP, 1988) (PP) tests reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity for all series. However, a major shortcoming with the 
standard unit root tests is that they do not allow for the possibility of structural breaks. 
Therefore, we follow Perron (1997) by allowing a break at an unknown location on 
both the trend and the intercept. We evaluate the test statistic focusing on the returns 
and volatility of oil and gold, and U.S. partisan conflict index. Table 2 reports the 
results of the Perron (1997) unit root test and estimated break date. The Perron unit 
root tests confirm these series are stationary, and there exists a break for oil returns, 
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gold returns and partisan conflict index at 2008:12, 1982:9 and 2009:12, respectively. 
Meanwhile, it detects that the oil volatility and gold volatility exist a break at 2008:10 
and 1982:09, respectively. This finding of breakpoints in the returns and volatility of 
oil and gold and partisan conflict index indicates that the linear model based on mean 
estimation may are not suitable to depict the relationship between them.  
 
 
 
Table 3 unit root test 
 ADF PP Perron break test 
 C C+T C C+T C+T date 
Conflict -2.623*(3) -3.096***(3) -5.357***(6) -6.637***(8) 6.229***(3) 2009m12 
Oil -12.045***(1) -12.054(1) -10.869(17) -10.803***(18) -12.562***(2) 2008m12 
Gold -18.243***(0) -18.446***(0) -18.265***(8) -18.402***(7) -19.261***(0) 1982m9 
Oil-VOL -4.006***(1) -4.487***(1) -2.942**(12) -3.311(12) -5.864***(1) 2008m10 
Gold-VOL -3.242**(1) -3.152*(1) -2.593*(14) -2.475(14) -4.900**(1) 1982m9 
Notes: C denotes constant, T denotes trend; **and ***indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Oil and Gold represent the returns of oil and gold, respectively. Oil-VOL and Gold-VOL denote the price volatility 
of oil and gold based on the estimation of SV-MA model, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the optimal 
lag order in the ADF and PP test based on the Schwarz Info criterion and Newey-west bandwidth.  
5. Empirical results and discussions 
5.1. Linear Granger causality test 
Though our objective is to analyze the quantile causality running from the U.S. 
partisan conflict index to the returns and volatility of oil and gold prices, for the sake 
of completeness and comparability, we also conducted the standard linear Granger 
causality test (Granger, 1969) based on the VAR model. The lag parameters for VAR 
model are selected based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Table 4 presents 
the results for linear Granger causality test. As can be seen from Table 4, the null 
hypothesis of non-causality from U.S. partisan conflict index to the returns of oil and 
gold cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. For the price volatility of gold, 
the null hypothesis of non-causality from the U.S. partisan conflict index to the 
volatility of gold can be rejected at the 5% significance level. However, for oil price 
volatility, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These results estimated in our paper 
may be due to the misspecification of the test model. It is well-known that the linear 
Granger causality test can miss the important nonlinear causal relationship (Balcilar et 
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al., 2017). Therefore, the insufficient or weak evidence for the causal relationship can 
be attributed to the low power of the linear Granger causality test if the time series 
analyzed are nonlinear or non-normal. 
Table 4 Linear Granger causality test (U.S. Partisan Conflict and oil and gold price) 
Null hypothesis Lag Chi-sq P-value Causality or not 
Panel 1: oil and gold price changes 
partisam oil  8 9.003 0.342 NO 
oil partisam  8 14.567* 0.068 Yes 
partisam gold  8 7.686 0.465 NO 
gold partisam  8 10.738 0.217 NO 
Panel 2: oil and gold price volatility  
partisam oil  8 9.052 0.338 No  
oil partisam  8 3.544 0.896 NO 
partisam gold  8 16.886** 0.031 Yes 
gold partisam  8 11.019 0.201 No  
 
Notes: *, **and ***indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; the symbol   represents 
the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality. The lag parameters are selected based on the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC). Yes in the last column indicates that the null hypothesis was rejected at least at the 10% 
significance level. 
5.2. BDS test for the nonlinear feature 
In order to motivate the use of the causality test in quantiles, in this section, we 
investigate the possibility of nonlinearity in the relationship between the U.S. partisan 
conflict index and returns and volatility of oil and gold prices. To this end, following 
Balcilar et al. (2017), we apply the BDS test (Broock et al., 1996) on the residuals of 
the returns and volatility of oil and gold price equation of the VAR(8) involving 
(relative) the U.S. partisan conflict, respectively. The BDS test is one of the most 
popular tests for nonlinearity. It is carried out by testing if increments to a data series 
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The test is asymptotically 
distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of i.i.d. increments. The basis 
of the BDS test is the concept of a correlation integral. A correlation integral is a 
measure of the frequency with which temporal patterns are repeated in the data.  
The results of BDS test are reported in Table 5. As shown in the panel 1 of Table 
5, for the returns and volatility series of oil and gold prices, the null hypothesis of i.i.d. 
residuals is strongly rejected at 1% level of significance across various dimensions 
(m). From the panel 2 and 3 of Table 5, we also see that for the residuals of the 
returns and volatility of oil and gold price equation of the VAR(8) involving (relative) 
the U.S. partisan conflict also pass the BDS test at the 1% significance level. It 
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indicates the relationship between the U.S. partisan conflict index and returns and 
volatility of oil and gold prices is nonlinearity and implies that the Granger causality 
tests based on a linear framework are likely to suffer from misspecification. In other 
words, the results of the linear test for Granger non-causality cannot be deemed robust 
and reliable. 
 
Table 5 BDS tests  
Panel 1: BDS test for each variable 
m 2 3 4 5 6 
Oil returns 0.041*** 0.065*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 
Gold returns 0.014*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 
Oil volatility 0.185*** 0.309*** 0.390*** 0.440*** 0.469*** 
Gold volatility 0.196*** 0.331*** 0.422*** 0.483*** 0.522*** 
Panel 2: BDS test for the residuals of commodity price changes equation of the VAR model with Partisan Conflict  
m 2 3 4 5 6 
Oil returns -VAR(8) 0.022*** 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 
Gold returns-VAR(8) 0.015*** 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 
Panel 3: BDS test for the residuals of commodity price volatility equation of the VAR model with Partisan Conflict   
Oil volatility-VAR(8) 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
Gold volatility-VAR(8) 0.019*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
Notes: The *** indicates significance at the 1% level. The parameter m is the embedding dimension. The lag 
parameters for VAR model are selected based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). m stands for the 
embedded dimension.  
5.3. Non-linear Granger causality tests 
Given the strong evidence of nonlinearity obtained from the BDS tests, we 
further investigate whether there exists nonlinear Granger causality running from the 
U.S. partisan conflict index to the returns and volatility of commodities prices. To this 
end, we use the nonlinear Granger causality test of H&J test (Hiemstra and Jones, 
1994) and D&P test (Diks and Panchenko, 2006). The results of H&J test and D& P 
nonlinear Granger causality test are presented in Table 6. We perform the tests for 
embedding dimension 5.1m  and select the lags 1-6. As can be seen that the null 
hypothesis of no nonlinear Granger causality running from the U.S. partisan conflict 
index to the returns and volatility of oil and gold prices in the sample period cannot be 
rejected at the 10% significance level. For these findings of no causality, it is because 
the nonlinear Granger causality test approaches just rely on conditional-mean 
estimation, and fail to capture the entire conditional distribution of returns and 
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volatility of oil and gold prices. Given the nonexistence of any evidence on the 
nonlinear Granger causality, we next turn to causality-in-quantiles tests, which 
considers all quantiles of the distribution not only the center of the distribution. It can 
provide more detail information on the relationship between the U.S. partisan conflict 
and oil and gold price movements for investors.  
 
Table 6 Non-linear Granger causality tests. 
YX ll   
H&J D&P H&J D&P 
(P-value) (P-value) (P-value) (P-value) 
Panel 1 Returns partisam oil  partisam gold  
1 0.732 (0.231) 0.714(0.237) 0.687 (0.245) 0.665 (0.252) 
2 0.3179 (0.375) 0.233(0.407) 0.443 (0.328) 0.329 (0.371) 
3 0.468 (0.319) 0.405(0.342) 0.693 (0.243) 0.601 (0.273) 
4 1.388*(0.082) 1.149(0.125) 0.763 (0.222) 0.768 (0.221) 
5 1.531*(0.062) 1.321*(0.093) 0.684 (0.246) 0.641 (0.261) 
6 1.361*(0.086) 1.145(0.126) 0.345 (0.364) 0.393 (0.346) 
Panel 2: Volatility partisam oil  partisam gold  
1 -1.090 (0.862) -0.916 (0.820)  -0.629 (0.735) -0.501 (0.691) 
2 -1.570 (0.941) -1.248 (0.894) -0.544 (0.706) -0.246 (0.597) 
3 -1.774 (0.961) -1.343 (0.910)  0.761 (0.776) -0.315 (0.623) 
4 -1.931 (0.973) -1.411 (0.920) -0.684 (0.753) -0.164 (0.565) 
5 -1.498 (0.932) -0.957 (0.830) -0.727 (0.766) -0.091 (0.536) 
6 -1.198 (0.884) -0.702 (0.758) -0.802 (0.788) -0.083 (0.532) 
Notes: *, **and ***indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively; YX ll   denotes the lag length. partisam oil  denotes the null hypothesis of no 
nonlinear Granger causality from partisan conflict index to oil prices.  
5.4. Granger causality test in quantiles 
In this section, we analyze the importance of U.S. partisan conflict index in 
predicting the returns and volatility of oil and gold price considering the quantiles 
conditional distribution of oil returns and volatility by employing a causality test in 
quantiles proposed by Troster (2016) (see results in Tables 7 and 8). Troster (2016) 
built a test statistic TS  and proposed a subsampling procedure to calculate critical 
values for TS . To apply the TS  test, three different quantile auto-regressive (QAR) 
models are estimated for each dependent variable at lag length from one to three, 
respectively.  
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5.4.1. Causality from U.S. Partisan Conflict to returns 
Table 7 presents the p-values for the test of the quantile-causality which running 
from the U.S. partisan conflict index to the returns of strategic commodities (crude oil 
and gold). Overall, it shows that the quantile-causality test for the quantile interval 
[0.1, 0.9] is significant at the 10% significance level, indicating that the U.S. partisan 
conflict has strong ability in predicting the returns of oil and gold prices. Moreover, it 
is mainly found that an outstanding pattern of Granger-causality from the U.S. 
partisan conflict index to the returns of oil and gold prices in the tails of the 
distribution of the strategic commodities prices movements. 
More specifically, as for oil returns, the test results of causality-in-quantiles 
running from partisan conflict to oil returns are insignificant at the median (quantiles 
at 0.5), but become significant at the tail quantiles of the conditional distribution of oil 
returns. The insignificance of the test results at the median of the conditional 
distribution of oil returns is in line with the results of the conditional mean estimation 
analysis of Table 5 and Table 6 (the linear Granger causality test and nonlinear 
Granger causality test, respectively) which does not find any evidence that (relative) 
partisan conflict predict oil returns as well. U.S. EPU index and partisan conflict 
index are all important indicators to reflect the current uncertainty in the United States 
(Bilgin et al., 2018). Our finding is partly in line with Balcilar et al. (2017) who find 
that U.S. EPU and equity market uncertainty have strong predictive power for oil 
returns over the entire distribution barring regions around the median. Likewise, Aloui 
et al. (2016), Shahzad et al. (2017) and Qadan and Nama (2018) confirm that there 
exist significant causal-flows from U.S. EPU to the oil returns over the entire sample 
period and for the majority of the quantile ranges as well. Furthermore, different from 
their studies, we find that the significance of the effect of U.S. partisan conflict on the 
conditional distribution of oil returns is particularly significant for the lower quantiles 
such as at around 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 quantiles. However, for oil returns at the higher 
quantiles such as at quantiles 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, it is found that the partisan conflict index 
cannot affect the oil returns, with the 0.9 quantiles being an exception. This implies 
that the explanatory power of partisan conflict on the oil returns is heterogeneous in 
different market conditions. Specifically, when the crude oil market is in a bearish 
state (oil returns at the lower quantiles), the partisan conflict has a significant impact 
on the oil returns. However, under a bullish state (oil returns at the higher quantiles), 
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the impact of the partisan conflict on oil returns is limited. The possible reason behind 
the finding is that the partisan conflict in the United States has caused a panic to the 
uncertainty of future policy, thereby resulting in a decrease in oil demand. When 
crude oil is in a bear market, that is, the price of crude oil is very low, the reduction in 
oil demand caused by U.S. partisan conflict will be more likely to lead to the decrease 
of oil prices than that in a bullish market. This has explained why U.S. partisan 
conflicts more likely to have an impact on the oil price movements when the crude oil 
market is in a bear market.  
Turn to gold returns, as can be seen from Table 7, the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no causality running from partisan conflict to gold returns is 
concentrated more around the tail quantiles. Likewise, there is no evidence in favor of 
the predictable effect of partisan conflict on the gold returns at the median quantiles. 
The results confirm the finding of Balcilar (2016) and Jones and Sackley (2016) that 
there exists a causality running from U.S. EPU to gold returns. Li and Lucey (2017) 
find that EPU is a positive determinant of gold being an investment safe haven. 
Meanwhile, this finding also supports the conclusion of Bilgin et al. (2018) which is 
closet to our work they find that worsening U.S. partisan conflict index can contribute 
to increases in the price of gold. Not only that, for gold returns at lower quantiles, we 
only find the partisan conflict can affect the gold returns at 0.2 quantiles of the 
conditional distribution of gold returns, and for other lower quantiles, it is not valid. 
In comparison, for gold returns at higher quantiles, the null hypothesis of no causality 
can be rejected around the 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9 quantiles. It indicates that the U.S. 
partisan conflicts are more likely to affect the higher quantiles of the conditional 
distribution of gold returns. In other words, partisan conflict matters only when the 
gold market is performing above its normal (average) mode, i.e., in bullish scenarios. 
This finding is different from the conclusions in the oil market. Media reports and 
investment recommendations often emphasize that gold acts as a classic safe-haven 
and hedging investment in times of economic and political uncertainty. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that when U.S partisan conflict intensifies, investors will choose gold to 
avoid risk, which has an impact on the gold market. Especially when the gold market 
is in a bull market, investors are more likely to choose gold to hedge their risk than 
that in a bear market, because they can gain profits in the bull market.  
Table 7 Quantile causality test results (sub-sampling p-values) from U.S. Partisan Conflict to 
returns of oil and gold price 
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 Lag [0.1, 0.9] 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Oil 1 0.094*  0.018**  0.047**  0.078*  0.091*  0.852  0.122  0.122  0.156  0.096*  
 2 0.091*  0.016**  0.016**  0.068*  0.081*  0.763  0.102  0.102  0.174  0.096*  
 3 0.096*  0.042**  0.057*  0.073*  0.089*  0.938  0.107  0.130  0.419  0.089*  
Gold 1 0.003***  0.167  0.013**  0.154  0.685  0.286  0.003***  0.036**  0.003***  0.049**  
 2 0.003***  0.047**  0.008***  0.130  0.547  0.266  0.003***  0.008***  0.003***  0.008***  
 3 0.005***  0.234  0.003***  0.284  0.508  0.396  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.016**  
Notes: The symbol *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
5.4.2. Causality from U.S. Partisan Conflict to volatility 
The volatility of commodity prices is often regarded as an indicator for the 
calculation of hedging. Therefore, it is meaningful to study the determinants of 
commodity price volatility. In this section, we examine whether the U.S. partisan 
conflict index has predictive power for the volatility of oil and gold prices. Table 8 
displays the results of causality in quantile test. As can be seen from Table 8, it is 
proven that the U.S. partisan conflict index affects the volatility of oil and gold prices 
over the entire conditional distribution, i.e., at various phases of the oil and gold 
market. This empirical evidence is consistent with Balcilar et al. (2017) who find that 
for oil volatility, the predictability of U.S. EPU and equity market uncertainty 
virtually covers the entire distribution.  
Table 8 Quantile causality test results (subsampling p-values) from U.S. Partisan Conflict to price 
volatility of oil and gold. 
 Lag [0.1, 0.9] 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Oil  1 0.049***  0.003***  0.003***  0.104  0.193  0.198  0.109  0.049**  0.029**  0.138  
2 0.016***  0.003***  0.003***  0.005***  0.003***  0.023***  0.081*  0.018**  0.005***  0.003***  
3 0.008***  0.003***  0.003***  0.008***  0.003***  0.003***  0.052*  0.018**  0.008***  0.003***  
Gold 1 0.003***  0.005***  0.003***  0.008***  0.010***  0.068*  0.102  0.003***  0.003***  0.010***  
2 0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.161  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  
3 0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.091*  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  
Notes: The symbol *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
5.5. Robustness analysis 
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results in this paper. One of our 
important conclusions is that the effect of U.S. partisan conflict on the returns and 
volatility of oil and gold clustered around the tail of the conditional distribution of 
returns. To this end, in the estimation process of quantile- causality test, we set more 
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numbers of quantiles with 0.05 step length. For lower quantiles, they are denoted by 
quantiles 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4; median quantiles including quantiles 
at 0.45, 0.5, higher quantiles contains the quantiles at 0.55, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 
0.85, 0.9, 0.95. Re-estimating the Granger quantiles causality test, results can be seen 
in Tables 9 and 10, the empirical results suggest that our main findings are not 
changed with the setting of more quantiles.  
 
 
Table 9 Quantile causality test results (sub-sampling p-values) from U.S. Partisan Conflict to oil 
and gold price in more quantiles. 
 Oil returns Gold returns 
Lag 1 2 3 1 2 3 
[0.05, 0.95] 0.094 0.091 0.096 0.0038*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
0.05 0.128 0.474 0.383 0.635 0.297 0.299 
0.1 0.018 0.016 0.042 0.167 0.047 0.234 
0.15 0.039 0.026 0.044 0.060* 0.026** 0.008*** 
0.2 0.047 0.016 0.057 0.013** 0.008*** 0.003*** 
0.25 0.078 0.055 0.065 0.031** 0.339 0.112 
0.3 0.078 0.068 0.073 0.154 0.130 0.284 
0.35 0.083 0.070 0.078 0.685 0.638 0.797 
0.4 0.091* 0.081 0.089 0.685 0.547 0.508 
0.45 0.128 0.276 0.398 0.401 0.292 0.273 
0.5 0.852 0.763 0.938 0.286 0.266 0.396 
0.55 0.135 0.078 0.089 0.148 0.021** 0.047** 
0.6 0.122 0.102 0.107 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
0.65 0.096* 0.112 0.117 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.018** 
0.7 0.122 0.102 0.130 0.036** 0.008*** 0.0038*** 
0.75 0.125 0.133 0.138 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
0.8 0.156 0.174 0.419 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
0.85 0.089* 0.091* 0.091* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
0.9 0.096* 0.096* 0.089* 0.049** 0.008*** 0.016** 
0.95 0.167 0.289 0.102 0.049** 0.044** 0.057* 
Notes: see Table 7. 
Table 10 Quantile causality test results (sub-sampling p-values) from U.S. Partisan Conflict to 
price volatility of oil and gold prices. 
 Oil volatility Gold volatility 
Lag 1 2 3 1 2 3 
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[0.05, 0.95] 0.047 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.05 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.003 0.049 0.039 
0.1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 
0.15 0.003 0.034 0.026 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.25 0.031 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.003 
0.3 0.104 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003 
0.35 0.096 0.018 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.4 0.193 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.003 
0.45 0.284 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.003 
0.5 0.198 0.023 0.003 0.068 0.003 0.003 
0.55 0.096 0.070 0.065 0.164 0.003 0.003 
0.6 0.109 0.081 0.052 0.102 0.161 0.091 
0.65 0.060 0.036 0.036 0.003 0.078 0.073 
0.7 0.049 0.018 0.018 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.75 0.031 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.8 0.029 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.85 0.044 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
0.9 0.138 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.003 
0.95 0.516 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.003 0.003 
Notes: Bold p-values denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level. 
6. Conclusions 
In recent years, U.S. politics have been characterized by a high degree of partisan 
conflict, which has led to increasing polarization and high policy uncertainty. Given 
the importance of US in the global commodity market, we employ the novel 
technique of causality-in-quantiles test to examine the ability of U.S. partisan conflict 
index in predicting the returns and volatility of oil and gold prices, using monthly data 
covering the period of January 1981 to October 2017. The main empirical findings of 
the current study can be summarized as follows.  
First, there is strong evidence in favor of the significant predictable effect of U.S. 
partisan conflict index on the oil and gold returns at the tails of the conditional 
distribution of oil and gold returns, respectively. Furthermore, it is found that oil 
returns and gold returns have different responses to U.S. partisan conflict in different 
market condition. More specifically, for oil returns, the partisan conflict has a strong 
predictive power on the oil returns when the crude oil market is in a bearish state (oil 
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returns at the lower quantiles), however, under a bullish state (oil returns at the higher 
quantiles), the impact of the partisan conflict on oil returns is not significant. By 
contrast, for gold returns, partisan conflict matters only when the gold market is 
performing above its normal (average) mode, i.e., in bullish scenarios. It is found that 
for gold returns at lower quantiles, the partisan conflict index has limited predictive 
power on the gold returns, with the 0.2 quantiles being an exception. Second, it is 
proven that the U.S. partisan conflict index significantly affects the volatility of oil 
and gold prices over the entire conditional distribution, i.e., at various phases of the 
oil and gold market. Finally, a robustness exercise using more quantiles to represent 
the market states and the empirical results support the findings.  
The results offer some meaningful implications to the investors and 
policymakers. For example, the study recommends that the U.S. partisan conflict 
index affect the lower quantiles of conditional distribution for oil returns, but it less 
likely to affect the higher quantiles of oil returns. It indicates that more attention 
should be drawn to track and monitor the U.S. partisan conflict risk when oil market 
is in the bearish state. However, for gold returns, partisan conflict matters for the gold 
returns only when the gold market is in a bullish scenario. It inspires gold investors 
that more prudent investment strategies are needed when gold market is in a bullish 
state. The volatility of oil and gold are affected by the partisan conflict in the United 
States. Therefore, the investors who choose the volatility of oil and gold as the 
monitoring index should pay close attention to the politics of the United States. 
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